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Lumer extends the epistemological approach to argumentation to account also for 
practical arguments. Furthermore, the choice in practical arguments in this respect 
is to confront one of the more challenging cases for the epistemological approach. In 
doing so, he formulates a set of preconditions of adequacy for rationally good 
practical arguments. Lumer’s system is rule-based one and he uses a particular 
logical language defined over sets of rules. The question is whether such system is 
suitable in the domain of practical arguments, where knowledge cannot be 
represented in a classical propositional language. The critical approach is one way 
to deal with this question, in which the rule-based system is tested against possible 
refuting test cases, or at least pointing at unintuitive and undesirable results for this 
argumentation formalism. Another question deals with the meta-level 
characteristics of consistency and completeness. The question is whether the 
proposed rule-based systems succeed to meet the objectives of an inference system, 
such that it will not lead to unintuitive results. Indeed, with this kind of systems it 
may be the case that an agent believes that “if a then it is always the case that b”, and 
the system returns as output a but not-b. Worse yet, if the agent also believes that “if 
c then it is always the case that not-b”, the system may return a and c, which means 
that the output of the system is indirectly inconsistent. However, in what follows I 
would rather address more general issues regarding the epistemological approach 
to practical arguments.  
 The first issue I want to address is the delicate relation between empirical 
theories that have a bearing on argumentation theories and the possibility to 
formulate on this basis hypothetical preconditions for every argument. It is the 
delicate move from argumentative considerations in concrete contexts of reasoning 
to universally adequate preconditions for this sort of arguments. Now, some of the 
preconditions, which Lumer classifies as the Empirical Hypotheses, are supposed to 
be based on empirical research in decision theories in psychology and economics. 
And, thus, Lumer dedicates part of his paper to a critical overview of current 
decision theories in the relevant fields of research. However, the requirement for 
objectivity from the epistemological approach forces the inevitable choice in one 
decision theory rather than another. For instance, Lumer in his paper argues against 
Kahneman & Tversky’s Prospect theory. Kahneman & Tversky’s model is a 
descriptive rather than normative decision model, which does not agree with 
Lumer’s own intuitions regarding what are good or rational decisions. It does not 
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agree with Lumer understanding of what should be practical justifications of actions. 
Lumer’s reasons for rejecting this or that decision model might be convincing, but 
they cannot disregard the fact that this scientific field, as any other scientific field of 
research, is in a constant state of disagreement and change. Given this state of 
affairs, an argumentation theory has to be sensitive to essential disagreements and 
changes in theories likewise. Thus, the prospects for being able to formulate one set 
of universally applicable preconditions are futile to begin with. 
 A complementary to this issue is the question of rationality. Any rule-based 
system, which has to do with belief revision, should fulfil some defined principles as 
rationality postulates. The purpose of these postulates is to govern the sound 
definition of an argumentation system. The critical question now is not whether 
these postulates are violated in the system, but rather whether these postulates are 
warranted from a philosophical standpoint. Another filed of philosophical 
investigation, which has many affinities with argumentation theories, is the 
philosophy of science. There one can find a variety of notions, which are offered as 
intuitive and desirable meaning for rationality. However, it is sufficient to examine 
three such suggestions, as Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend, to see 
that no such intuitive and desirable meaning for rationality is possible. The 
philosophical wars over the right meaning of rationality are only a symptom to 
diverse world views and as such, prevent any philosophical consensus, even in the 
sense of scientific consensus in a given field of research and in a given time. 
 The second issue I want to address is a consequent of the former. Lumer’s 
reasoning in his paper might be classified as a hypothetical reasoning. Lumer’s 
strategy in overcoming the difficulties of analysing practical arguments in terms of 
the epistemological approach to argumentation is by formulating a set of adequacy 
conditions for all practical arguments without any exception. These preconditions 
are supposed to satisfy the requirements for the justification of the epistemological 
approach, namely to provide true and acceptable beliefs. The overall hypothetical 
reasoning in this paper signifies a detailed epistemological stance, which supports 
the connection between the preconditions to good practical arguments on the one 
hand, and the paper’s thesis on the other hand. The expected criticism to such 
approach is that hypothetical reasoning by its nature does not presuppose the 
complicate reality of their subject matter with its vast variety. So how do we know 
that the preconditions do or do not engage the purpose of Lumer’s paper? There is 
nothing wrong with this noble argumentation strategy to begin with. However, this 
argumentation strategy concerns the fundamental controversy regarding the 
epistemological approach to argumentation. 
 Lumer criticizes the non-epistemic criteria for justifying practical arguments, 
such as Habermas’ rightness and van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s acceptability, on 
the ground that they are ambiguous and do not have a specific meaning. 
Furthermore, he claims that any attempt to define these criteria in more specific 
terms would eventually ends up in providing truth criteria. In doing so, Lumer 
argues indirectly for a more general philosophical assertion, stating that any 
relativist conception of argumentation must eventually culminate in terms of true or 
false. 
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 I will not pretend to add to this controversy, but state that when Toulmin 
emphasised in the late 1950’s the justificatory function of argumentation, he 
changed the focus from traditional epistemology to pragmatics or from Kant to 
Wittgenstein. Thus, the nature of justification had become a relativistic concept. 
Habermas’ rightness and van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s acceptability are 
deliberately ambiguous. The ideal of inference as determined by fixed bonds of 
logical rules as hypothetical and universal rules on the one hand, and truth as 
correspondence on the other, has collapsed. The theory of argumentation is more 
about establishing consensus and the norms of justification as constantly revised 
and relative to a given community. This understanding of argumentation, however, 
is not only compatible with actual uses of arguments, but also maintains a workable 
and useful epistemological demarcation between good and bad arguments. 
Toulmin’s and Perelman’s argumentation turn following the linguistic turn in 
philosophy leaves room for different kinds of analysis of the processes which lead to 
evaluating arguments in varied contexts. 
 
